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CHAPTER 11 
Domestic Relations and Persons 
WILLIAM J. GREENLER, JR. 
This chapter has been subdivided into six topics: (1) marriage; (2) 
divorce; (3) support of dependents; (4) adoptions and placement of 
children; (5) parent and child; and (6) guardians and conservators. 
The choice and sequence of these topics are based more on logical divi-
sion of the general subject than upon the relative importance of the 
matters discussed. Hence the chapter will begin with some material 
which is by no means of arresting importance, under "marriage," 
whereas the most important and controversial material presented by the 
legislation and decisions of the survey year will be found in the section 
on adoptions midway through the chapter, wherein the now famous 
Goldman cases are treated. It is hoped that the arrangement adopted 
will be best suited to this volume as a work of reference and also as the 
first of a series wherein the same arrangement may be followed year 
after year. 
A. MARRIAGE 
§ 11.1. Application of the two-year prohibition against remarriage 
of a libelee. The familiar statutes prohibiting a libelee in a Massa-
chusetts divorce from remarrying for two years after the decree abso-
lute,! and providing that a person residing in this state and intending 
to continue to reside here shall be subject to the prohibition even when 
he contracts a marriage in another state,2 were again applied in the case 
of Sweeney v. Kennard,3 decided on July 1, 1954. 
One of the questions raised therein was the validity of the marriage 
of Byron and Mae Horne, upon which depended the right of Mae's 
estate to inherit as the widow of Byron. Byron's former wife had di-
vorced him in Massachusetts by a decree which became absolute on 
December 17, 1914. He married Mae in New York on December 30, 
1914, where both described themselves in the application for their 
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§11.1. 1 G.L., c. 208, §24. 
2 G.L., c. 207, §1O. 
31954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 603, 120 N.E.2d 910. 
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license as residents of Massachusetts. They made their home thereafter 
in New Hampshire until 1917, but within a few weeks after the two 
years had expired they returned to Massachusetts to live.4 The Pro-
bate Court granted a decree holding, by necessary implication, that the 
marriage was valid. On appeal the Supreme Judicial Court, reiterating 
the familiar principle that the finding implies all subsidiary findings 
permissible upon the evidence to support it,5 held that the Probate 
Court must have found that the parties did not intend to continue to 
reside in Massachusetts and that the evidence did not require a con-
trary finding. 
The Sweeney case is disappointing in its lack of discussion of the 
question of change of residence. The record, of course, contained no 
declarations of intention or the like, but presented the sole question 
whether remaining outside the state boundary for a period just long 
enough to cover the prohibition would, of itself, create an inference 
that the parties intended to continue to reside here. The court, in sub-
stance, says that such an inference is not required. Whether such an in-
ference would be permitted is, of course, not decided. 
Although the case of Barnard v. BarnardJ6 another important de-
cision of the survey year, will be considered under the section relative 
to divorce,7 the question of domicile raised therein was very similar to 
that in the Sweeney case. In the Barnard case a husband left a wife in 
Massachusetts and established residence in Nevada "for the sole pur-
pose" of obtaining a divorce, as found by the Probate Court. After the 
minimum period he brought the action and obtained an uncontested 
decree. Thereafter he returned, not to Massachusetts but to a nearby 
town in New Hampshire, where he claimed his residence. However, he 
continued to maintain his office in Newburyport, commuting back and 
forth across the state line. The Court held there was no error in the 
finding that there never was a domicile in Nevada and that the divorce 
was invalid. 
The cases are, of course, not inconsistent: first, because the Barnard 
case does not infer that there was still a domicile in Massachusetts, but 
only that there was not one in Nevada; and second, because in each case 
the Court merely held that the evidence did not require a finding 
different from that of the lower court. Considered together, however, 
they indicate that questions of residence and domicile are largely 
factual, and neither case warrants our drawing too broad a rule of law 
therefrom. 
§11.2. Impounding of certain marital records. General Laws, 
Chapter 46, Section 2A was amended 1 to provide that notices of inten-
• This does not appear clearly in the opinion, but is obtained from the record. 
The question of residence as reported here was much more clearly and squarely 
raised by the record and briefs than would appear from the reported decision. 
5 See Williams v. Howard, 1953 Mass. Adv. Sh. 589, 112 N.E.2d 247, and cases cited. 
61954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 519, 120 N.E.2d 187. 
7 Section 11.4 intra. 
§11.2. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 324. 
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tion of marriage and marriage records of illegitimate persons be per-
mitted to be inspected, and copies thereof furnished, only upon "proper 
judicial order" or upon request of the person himself or his attorney, 
parent, guardian or conservator. A person whose official duties entitled 
him to the information, in the opinion of the town clerk or state secre-
tary, as the case may be, may be permitted to examine such records; but 
no provision is made for such person to receive copies. 
B. DIVORCE 
§1l.3. Divorce grounds: Cruel and abusive treatment. Further in-
dication of what seems to be a stiffening attitude on the part of the 
Court toward divorce may be found in Adams v. Adams, decided on 
April 8, 1954.1 In that case the principal facts found were that the 
libelant and libelee were married in 1947 and lived together in Massa-
chusetts until 1951, during which time they had trouble over religion. 
The libelee on several occasions insulted the libelant with an offensive 
name pertaining to her religion. It was also found that between 1951 
and 1952 the libelant secured employment in New York, returning only 
occasionally; that the libelant claimed that her husband paid more 
attention to his motorcycle than to her; that upon her last return here 
she found that the libelee had rented the house; that this resulted in a 
quarrel in which, she claimed, he slapped, kicked, and beat her; that 
the libelant then returned to New York, where she stayed; and that she 
had never been in fear of her husband. The Probate Court found no 
cruel and abusive treatment and dismissed the plea for divorce.2 This 
action was upheld on appeal. 
The stiffening attitude alluded to in the preceding paragraph, which 
may be the beginning of a trend, first appeared in Sylvester v. Sylvester, 
decided in 1953.3 In that case there was evidence that the libelant, the 
husband, was a writer; that his wife on one occasion slammed the 
kitchen door and broke the glass; that she tore the sleeves out of his 
shirt; that there were almost continual quarrels, which the libelant be-
lieved were deliberately conceived to prevent him from pursuing his 
employment, and which he said affected him mentally so that his in-
come was substantially reduced; and that on one occasion she kicked 
him. The Court held that the evidence did not warrant a finding of 
cruel and abusive treatment and reversed a decree of divorce. 
For at least ten years prior to the Sylvester case, the Court's tendency 
had been, almost without exception, to favor the granting of a divorce 
§11.3. 11954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 383. lI8 N.E.2d 759. 
• The decree was as follows: "After hearing. it appearing to the court that the 
allegations of said libel are not sustained and that said divorce should not be 
granted. it is decreed that said libel be continued on the docket; that the said 
libelee ... be given the custody of ... their minor child; and that said libellant 
be permitted to see and take said child at reasonable times. until the further order 
of the court." 
• 330 Mass. 397. 113 N.E.2d 830. 
3
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wherever possible, and whereas it was not uncommon to hold plainly 
wrong a decree denying a divorce,4 it was very rare to reverse a decree 
granting a divorce. 
It seems probable that the Sylvester case, and perhaps even the Adams 
case, would have been decided differently a few years ago. If there is 
truly a reversed trend, there may be many interesting decisions in the 
near future. 
§1l.4. Migratory divorces: Jurisdiction. In Barnard v. Barnard,1 
the Court was faced with a difficult case in the area of migratory divorce. 
In an action in the Probate Court by W against H for separate support, 
alleging failure to provide and desertion, it appeared that H left her 
in April, 1953, and had not returned; that he brought a Massachusetts 
divorce which was dismissed without prejudice; that H went to Nevada 
on May 30,1953, and on July 13 brought a libel there, which W did not 
contest and which resulted in a decree of divorce on August 18, 1953; 
that H immediately returned to the neighborhood of Newburyport, 
their former home, living across the state line in New Hampshire and 
traveling every day to his old place of business in Newburyport. The 
probate judge granted a decree for separate support, and this was 
affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court restated that the de-
cree of separate support could not stand if the prior divorce in Nevada 
were valid,2 thus squarely raising the issue. The treatment of the issue 
of domicile, however, is abruptly brief and not at all helpful. Although 
affirming that "a State cannot validly grant a divorce unless one of the 
spouses is domiciled within its borders," 3 and citing Heard v. Heard,4 
upon which the appellant relied heavily, the Court, without even specif-
ically distinguishing the Heard case, bluntly concluded that "there was 
no error in the finding that the husband never intended to acquire a 
domicile in Nevada and never did acquire one." 5 The appellant had 
argued in the Probate Court, and in his brief on appeal,6 that the hus-
band had left with the intention of never returning to live in Massa-
chusetts, and had not returned; that since he had abandoned his Massa-
chusetts domicile, very little was required to set up a new one, and his 
physical presence in Nevada, even though temporary, was enough to 
• See, for instance, on cruel and abusive treatment, Mooney v. Mooney, 317 Mass. 
433, 58 N.E.2d 748 (1944) (holding a single act of cruelty enough in the circum-
stances); Brown v. Brown, 323 Mass. 332, 81 N.E.2d 820 (1948) ("sensual"' conduct 
between libelee and her own father, which upset libelant and caused him loss of 
weight, was held to require a decree of divorce). For opinions in cases involving 
other grounds or issues, but indicating the philosophy of the Court, compare Redd-
ington v. Reddington, 317 Mass. 760, 59 N.E.2d 775, 159 A.L.R. 1448 (1945), and Hart-
well v. Hartwell, 318 Mass. 355, 61 N.E.2d 537 (1945). 
§11.4. '1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 519, 120 N.E.2d 187; see also Section 11.1 supra. 
21954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 520, 120 N.E.2d at 188. See Welker v. Welker, 325 Mass. 
738, 743, 92 N.E.2d 373, 376 (1950). 
• 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 520, 120 N.E.2d at 188. 
• 323 Mass. 357, 82 N.E.2d 219 (1948). 
51954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 521, 120 N.E.2d at 189. 
• Brief for Respondent, p. 9. 
4
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constitute a new domicile there. The Court apparently was not im-
pressed. 
In the Heard case it appeared that the libelant went to Nevada for 
the purpose of obtaining a divorce, just as in the Barnard case. How-
ever, in the Heard case there had been a home of some degree of per-
manency established and retained in Nevada, and the libelant never 
returned to the East. The Court in that case reversed the lower court 
and held it plainly wrong in finding that there was no bona fide domi-
cile in Nevada, even though a domicile was established for the sole 
purpose of obtaining a divorce.7 However, it is only on the basis of 
the degree of permanency, or apparent permanency, of the Nevada 
horne that the two cases can be distinguished. In both, the libelant 
never returned to live in Massachusetts (although in the Barnard case 
he did business here); and if the purpose, which was admittedly to ob-
tain a divorce which could not be obtained in accordance with Massa-
chusetts law, did not vitiate the domicile in the Heard case, surely it 
should not in the Barnard case. It is disappointing that the Court in 
the latter case did not see fit to discuss the question and the distinction, 
• which it apparently felt was valid, at greater length. 
c. SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS 
§11.5. Support of dependents: Background. An amended Chapter 
273A,1 effective October 1, 1954, was designed to transfer jurisdiction of 
all cases in this category to the District Courts and, in certain respects, 
to facilitate the procedure involved. The original law, passed in 1951, 
gave jurisdiction to the Probate CourtS.2 Briefly, the procedure estab-
lished under the old law and continued under the new provides that 
where a person who has a duty of support owed to another (whether 
wife, child, or parent) resides in another jurisdiction which also has 
enacted a similar law,3 the obligee may start proceedings for support 
where he or she is domiciled. The proceedings are then certified to 
the state where the obligor is domiciled and that state proceeds to 
obtain jurisdiction of the respondent and to enforce the duty. 
§11.6. Support of dependents: Experience under prior law. The 
experience of the fourteen Probate Courts under prior law was charac-
terized by an amazing amount of variation in interpretation of the law 
and in methods of handling cases. Where the law provided that the 
district attorney be "notified," the response of the various district at-
• The provisions of G.L., c. 208, §39, to the effect that a divorce obtained in another 
jurisdiction for the purpose of evading our law will not be recognized, are greatly 
limited by this and similar decisions. If an actual domicile exists where the divorce 
is obtained, it must be recognized, notwithstanding the libelant"s purpose and this 
statute. 
§11.5. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 556. 
• Acts of 1951, c. 657. 
3 Latest information indicates that forty·six states and several territories and pos-
sessions have adopted substantially similar laws. 
5
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tomeys varied [rom assigning a special assistant to the prosecution of 
the cases to complete indifference. Where the district attorney did not 
take an active part, the Probate Courts appointed a local attorney to 
act for the petitioner; his compensation was of course contingent upon 
the success attained in finding the respondent and compelling pay-
ments. Since the Probate Courts have no probation department, orders 
had to be enforced by contempt proceedings; and where the district 
attorney took no part, the procedure was burdensome and ineffective. 
In at least one Probate Court, the register of probate himself started 
proceedings for contempt, apparently on the theory that because the 
respondent was ordered to make the payments to him he became the 
obligee. Since this amounts to a clerk of court in his official capacity 
becoming a party to litigation in his own court, it created an anomalous 
situation which does not seem required by the language of the law. 
Where a Probate Court to which a case had been referred discovered 
that the respondent was in fact within the jurisdiction of another Pro-
bate Court, the question arose whether direct transfer could be made. 
Some felt that it could, under the general statute relative to transfer of 
jurisdiction; ! others insisted that the case be returned to the state of its 
origin and a new referral made from there. Although in some counties 
the over-all success was fairly good, in most it was unsatisfactory. 
§11.7. Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act: Main 
provisions. Although the new amendment rewrites most of the chap-
ter,! the actual changes, other than the transfer of jurisdiction to the 
District Courts, are minor. The scope and purpose of the proceedings 
are the same as heretofore. The basic procedures are the same, in-
cluding the filing of the petition in the court of the initiating state; the 
certificate of its judge stating that it appears there may be a duty of 
support; the forwarding of certified copies of the petition, of the certifi-
cate, and of the law itself; and the proceedings in the responding state. 
Costs are reduced to $3 for entry plus, where Massachusetts is the re-
sponding state, $2 for service of process.2 The court of the responding 
state has power to appoint counsel to represent the petitioner and 
assess his compensation against the respondent. 
There are two important changes: first, a probation officer may be 
assigned to the case who will handle the payments and see to the en-
forcement of any order; and second, provision is made for direct trans-
fer to another District Court when it is discovered that the respondent 
is in the other district. The first should remove the cause of most of the 
inefficiency and delay experienced heretofore, and should of itself afford 
sufficient improvement to justify the change. The second will remove 
any question as to jurisdiction such as was indicated above.3 
§11.6. 1 G.L., c. 215, §8A. 
§11.7. 1 G.L., c. 273A, inserted by Acts of 1954, c. 556. 
• G.L., c. 262. §§2 and 8, as amended by Acts of 1954, c. 556, §§5 and 6. The former 
law provided an entry fee of $4 plus, where Massachusetts was the responding state, 
a deposit in an amount to be set by the Probate Court to cover costs of service. 
S See Section 11.6 supra. 
\ 
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Cases in Probate Courts under the old law are transferred to the Dis-
trict Court of appropriate jurisdiction as of October 1, 1954, except 
that any case which has been heard by the Probate Court, but not de-
cided, will remain in probate until final decree is entered and will then 
be transferred.4 
There is provision for appeal on questions of law to the appellate 
division of the District Court.1i 
D. ADOPTIONS AND PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN 
§1l.8. Adoptions: Background problems. Within recent years 
much public attention has been focused upon the knotty problems 
arising in connection with adoptions of children, principally adoptions 
by strangers to the blood. Racial and religious problems have aggra-
vated the difficulties and made more delicate their solution. Also, there 
has come to light a widespread traffic in child placement for hire, and 
in Massachusetts and New York both doctors and lawyers have been 
prosecuted for illicitly arranging placements and adoptions. In spite 
of the fact that the Division of Child Guardianship in the State Depart-
ment of Public Welfare has been given broad power to supervise place-
ment of children, and in spite of the fact that stringent criminal laws 
regulate such placements and penalize unauthorized placements, the 
fact remains that many illicit placements are made, presumably for 
hire, and the only persons who could give evidence to convict the 
guilty are unwilling to do so for obvious reasons. 
§11.9. Adoptions: The 1950 law. In 1950 the legislature attempted 
to strengthen the law in several respects, principally by enacting a pro-
vision 1 requiring that the religion of the child be protected by placing 
the child with foster parents of the same religion "where practicable." 
In case of diversity, the child's religion was deemed to be that of its 
mother. The court could allow an adoption involving diversity of re-
ligion where it deemed this to be for the best interests of the child, but 
where it did so the court was required to file a memorandum of the 
facts involved in its decision as part of the minutes of the proceeding. 
The test of this law came in the Gaily case.2 In a split decision in-
volving the adoption of a Catholic child by Jewish foster parents with 
the consent of the natural mother, the majority held that it was not 
shown on the record to be "practicable" to place the child with Catholic 
foster parents because it was not made to appear that any such people 
were ready and willing - and of course, able and suitable - to adopt 
this particular child. A forceful dissenting opinion was submitted by 
Justice Ronan, presenting the arguments which have since met legisla-
tive favor. Both opinions are worth a second reading. Whatever may 
• Acts of 1954, c. 556, §8. 
• Id. §9. 
§11.9. 1 Acts of 1950, c. 737, §3, amending G.L., c. 210, §5B. 
• Petition of Gally, 329 Mass. 143, 107 N.E.2d 21 (1952). 
7
Greenler: Chapter 11: Domestic Relations and Persons
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1954
96 1954 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §ll.lO 
be the merits of each opinion, the decision of the majority made it clear 
that the 1950 law had not accomplished its intended result. 
§ll.lO. Adoptions: The Goldman cases.! In 1953, not long after 
the Cally case, the question was again presented to a Probate Court in 
even more striking form, accompanied by even more publicity. Twins 
of Catholic parentage were given over by their mother to Jewish foster , 
parents, under circumstances which did not appear clear, chiefly be-
cause the mother took no part after having placed the children. It 
was brought out in evidence before the Probate Court that the Jewish 
couple were warned by their attorney that there was doubt that they 
could adopt the children because of the 1950 statute establishing a 
policy against a change of religion, but they were convinced that once 
they had had the children for a while no judge would take them away. 
The Probate Court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the i. 
interests of the children, and he appeared in opposition to the adoption 
when the case came to hearing. The guardian ad litem produced in 
evidence that many fine homes were available in the vicinity in which 
Catholic couples were waiting for children such as these to adopt, and 
that if the children were removed from the Goldman home they could 
be placed in anyone of a number of suitable Catholic homes immedI-
ately. This was frankly intended to counter the reasoning of the 
majority in the Cally case that these facts did not appear, and therefore 
that the placement of the child with persons of the same religion was 
not shown to be "practicable." The probate judge found in part that '" 
the Goldmans were substantial people, maintaining a good home finan-
cially, and in short that the adoption was a good one apart from the 
racial 2 and religious aspects; but that the children could be placed 
with parents of their own religion and that therefore the statute had 
not been complied with and the adoption should not be granted. The 
line was again squarely drawn. 
After holding the case under advisement for a relatively long time, 
the Supreme Judicial Court on September 27, 1954, affirmed the de-
cision of the Probate Court. In a very lucid and readable opinion, 
Chief Justice Qua pointed out that the judge had, in effect, found that 
it was "practicable" to place the children with Catholic foster parents, 
and that the children's mother was still a Catholic even though she 
had not lived up to the ideals of her religion; that the finding was 
warranted by the evidence and should not be overturned on the sup-
position, unsupported by any evidence, that the mother might not con-
sent to an adoption by other people than these petitioners. 
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute, rejecting both 
the argument that it violated the provisions regarding freedom of re-
ligion and the contention that it interfered with the mother's right to 
determine her child's religion. The Court observed that "the principle 
§11.10. 1 Petitions of Goldman, 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 745, 121 N.E.2d 843. 
• It was found that the twins were blond and blue-eyed and that the petitioners ! 
had dark complexions and dark hair. and that there was an obvious racial diversity. 
1934 Mass. Adv. Sh. 745, 746, 121 N.E.2d 843. 844. 
8
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that children should, in general, be adopted within the faith of their 
natural parents has received widespread approval," 3 and that most of 
our states have statutes similar to the Massachusetts law. Steps have 
been taken to appeal the decision to the United States Supreme Court 
on constitutional grounds. 
§ll.ll. Adoptions: The new law. The 1954 law,! which resulted 
from the foregoing background, and which was enacted while the Gold-
man cases were pending before the Supreme Judicial Court, inserts a 
new Section 2A in Chapter 2lO of the General Laws. It provides that 
no decree for adoption of a child under fourteen shall be entered unless 
.,' the "petitioner" 2 is a blood relative or a stepparent.of the child, or was 
nominated in the will of a deceased parent of the child to be guardian I or adoptive parent, or unless the placement was made or the petition 
j for adoption approved by the Department of Public Welfare or an I agency authorized by the Department for the purpose. 
j Provision is made for any petitioner, aggrieved by the arbitrary re-
fusal of the Department or an agency to approve a petition, to apply 
for a review by an advisory board of the Department set up in another 
new law; 3 and an adverse finding of the advisory board may be ap-
I pealed to the Probate Court in which the petition is pending, "which 
l shall review the action of the department or agency and shall make final 
I. determination as to the approval" by the board.4 
\ There is also added to Section 5A of Chapter 2lO a provision that 
I after the report of the Department in regard to a pending adoption I has been filed, the court may, where it is deemed in the best interests 
I... 
of the child, order its removal from the adoptive home and appoint a 
guardian 5 to have custody and provide for its future care. 
§1l.12. Adoptions: Comments on the new law. The most casual 
, analysis of the new law evokes the observation that the State Depart-
I.i ment of Public Welfare and the social agencies approved by it are given 
! broad power. This was, of course, desired by both social and religious 
1 authorities as the law was being conceived and sponsored. Except in 
\ cases of relatives, stepparents, and testamentary nominations, where 
I the law does not apply, the Department or an approved agency can f effectively prevent a decree of adoption unless its action is shown to be 
"arbitrary." This provision would have settled the Goldman case, for I the Department and a local agency both disapproved of the adoption I of the children. 
81954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 745, 750, 121 N.E.2d 843, 846. 
§11.I1. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 649, approved June 10, 1954. 
2 Id. §l. 
3 Acts of 1954, c. 646; see Section 11.13 intra. 
4 This will undoubtedly raise the question whether "review" is limited to the 
record of the hearing before the advisory board, or whether additional evidence will 
be received. 
5 Acts of 1954, c. 649, §2. The guardian must be a relative or a person designated 
by the Department or an authorized agency. Before removal, notice and a hearing 
.~ are required. 
9
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.. 
The principal power of the Department and such agencies, however, 
is largely negative, or preventive. Approval of the Department or agency 
does not by any means require that the court grant the adoption. The 
older provisions of Chapter 210 are still in effect, and, in substance, 
require the court to find that the adoption is for the best interests of the 
child under all the circumstances. 
To the same degree as the "veto" power of the Department and 
approved agencies is extended, so also is their responsibility. The suc-
cess of the new law in its application and administration will depend 
largely upon the discretion and judgment exercised by the personnel 
of these agencies. 
§1l.13. Child protection law: General revision enacted. Along 
with the new adoption law discussed in the immediately preceding sec-
tions, and enacted on the same day, was a rather lengthy and compre-
hensive revision of the child care and protection law.! Its policies stem 
from the same problems as prompted the adoption law: namely, to 
regulate further the placement of nonrelatives, to prevent trafficking 
in placements and adoptions for hire or reward, and to give greater 
protection to the physical, cultural, and particularly the religious well-
being of children. To this end various provisions appear including 
a partial reorganization of the Department of Public Welfare. With-
out enumerating every section, some of which are of little import, the 
following will summarize the more important provisions. 
§1l.14. Child protection law: Specific provisions. After preliminary 
statements of policy and definitions, Sections 4-13 of the new law pro-
ceed with strict regulation of "independent foster homes for children." 
A person is maintaining such a home if he, not being a relative by 
blood or by marriage or the legal guardian of the child, takes into his 
care a child under sixteen for "hire, gain, or reward." 1 The main-
tenance of an independent foster home as so defined requires a permit 
from the Department of Public Welfare. Further, no person other than 
a parent is permitted to place a child under sixteen of whom he is not 
the legal guardian with any person not a relative by blood or marriage 
for the purpose of giving the child a home or for board or for adoption. 
It is noteworthy that this sentence contains no mention of gain or re- , 
ward: it is a flat prohibition. 
The Department is given power to visit and in some cases is required 
to visit children in foster homes. Agents of the Department are 
authorized to remove children subject to the foregoing provisions 
where, in the judgment of the Department the welfare of the child or 
its protection from neglect or abuse requires its removal, and they may 
apply for a warrant to enter, investigate, and remove as aforesaid to a 
court "having jurisdiction." It is not clearly defined what court "has 
jurisdiction." Probate Courts have jurisdiction of adoption; District 
Courts have jurisdiction of several branches of the law relative to 
§11.l3. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 646, amending G.L., c. ll9, §§1-51 inclusive. 
§11.l4. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 646, §1(4). 
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neglect of family, juvenile cases, and the like. In Section 24 the Boston 
Juvenile Court and the District Courts, juvenile sessions, are given 
jurisdiction to commit children to the care of the Department. 
Sections 14 to 22, inclusive, regulate agencies providing foster care 
for children, and their licensing and control by the Department. The 
pattern is similar to that of the provisions regarding independent 
foster homes. Section 23 gives the Department power, and in certain 
cases the duty, to accept children for foster care, and to seek guardian-
ship of any minor who is without proper guardianship, including rights 
of custody. 
Sections 24 to 31, inclusive, provide for commitment to the care of 
the Department by the juvenile sessions of the District Courts, or the 
Boston Juvenile Court, of children found without proper care and dis-
cipline, and to assess the persons responsible for payment for their care 
and support. 
Sections 32 and 33 provide that the children shall be placed (with 
certain exceptions in extraordinary cases) in private families; and that 
the right of the parents to have the child brought up in their religion 
an~ the "right" 2 of the child to be brought up in the religion of its 
parents shall be protected. 
The remaining sections regulate abandonment and interstate traffic 
in children, and make miscellaneous provisions complementing the 
foregoing. 
§11.15. Advisory board within the Department of Public Welfare. 
The same act 1 sets up an advisory board in the Department consisting 
of fifteen members; five members are required to be women, and five 
shall be "persons with special experience and interest in child welfare," 
who shall constitute a special advisory subcommittee.2 
E. P ARENT AND CHILD 
§11.16. Criminal neglect of children. The statute punishing 
abandonment and neglect of minor children was broadened and 
strengthened by 1954 legislation.1 The law applies to any husband or 
father, to a mother, to a guardian with custody or any "custodian"; and 
it penalizes not only desertion, abandonment, and neglect, but also 
failing to provide proper "physical, educational, or moral care and 
guidance" and permitting a child to "grow up under conditions ... 
damaging to the child's sound character development," and failing "to 
provide proper attention for said child." 
• The law speaks of the "right" of the child being denied to the parents, even 
though the latter are both deceased. Although the natural right of a child to the 
religion of its parents may be clear, at least morally speaking, it is difficult to follow 
how a right of one person can be denied to another, especially when that latter per-
son is deceased. 
§11.l5. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 646, §2, amending G.L., c. 18, §2. 
• For further discussion of the new board, see Section 19.4 infra. 
§11.l6. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 539, amending G.L., c. 273, §l. 
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§1l.17. Blood tests to determine paternity. Legislation approved 
March 23, 1954,1 for the first time in this Commonwealth gives official 
recognition to the value of blood tests in questions of paternity. By 
this law, the defendant in a proceeding to determine paternity has a 
right to request that a serology test be performed on the mother, child, 
and himself by a physician designated by the court. Refusal of the 
parties to submit to the test may be used against them, "unless the 
court, for good cause, otherwise orders." The results may be admissi-
ble in evidence, but only in case of definite exclusion of the defendant 
as the father. 
F. GUARDIANS AND CONSERVATORS 
§1l.18. Removal of guardian and appointment of successor. Legis-
lation in 1954 provided that upon removal of a guardian or conservator 
(as well as other fiduciaries) the Probate Court may, if the petition for 
removal contains a prayer therefor, appoint a successor in the same 
decree without a separate petition for appointment.1 
Heretofore there has sometimes been an unavoidable hiatus between 
a removal and the appointment of a successor to fill the vacancy, as, 
for instance, where the appointment requires notice (citation). It is 
obvious that this can be undesirable, particularly in the case of guard-
ians and conservators of insane or incompetent persons needing per-
sonal care. The new statute is designed to avoid this, by including the 
removal and the filling of the vacancy in one petition, one notice (cita-
tion), and one decree. 
§11.19. Powers of temporary conservator. In 1954 new legislation1 
provided that a temporary conservator shall have the same powers as a 
permanent conservator and shall continue to have such powers pending 
an appeal, unless otherwise ordered, until the appointment of a per-
manent conservator or until the trust is legally terminated. The pro-
visions regarding temporary conservators are thus made parallel with 
those already in effect regarding temporary guardians. 
§11.17. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 232, inserting new §12A in G.L., c. 273. 
§11.18. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 478, §2. 
§11.19. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 330. 
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